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We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in 
the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The 
first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects 
can redistribute payoffs among other subjects in their group. We find that 
cooperation and efficiency increases substantially with this redistribution scheme, 
and that the redistribution option is popular. Our results provide an intuitive 
explanation for why an imposed redistribution rule, as proposed by Falkinger 
(1996), is capable of sustaining cooperation in the provision of public goods. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper provides an experimental test of the effects of pure redistribution on the 
provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the 
standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among 
other subjects in their group, thereby simultaneously rewarding one subject and sanctioning 
another subject within their group. In the experiment we require that redistribution is budget 
neutral, i.e. that what is taken from one player must be given to another player. As a 
consequence, redistribution is costless for society. Moreover, redistribution is a low-cost choice 
in the sense that it entails no direct material cost or benefit for the decision maker.  
We find that pure redistribution strongly improves cooperation. In particular, 
contributions to the public good are more than three times as high (76%) with the redistribution 
option than in a control treatment without the option to redistribute (22%). We find that subjects 
use redistribution systematically to punish free riders and reward cooperators. Finally, we show 
that the option to redistribute is not only efficient, it is also popular. Subjects seem to anticipate 
the beneficial effects of pure redistribution. When asked to vote on the introduction of the 
redistribution scheme, 85% of all groups approve of redistribution.  
Our study relates to Falkinger (1996) who suggested that redistribution may improve 
cooperation in the provision of public goods. In particular, Falkinger proposed an exogenously 
imposed, budget-neutral redistributive mechanism that subsidizes (i.e. rewards) above-average 
contributions and taxes (i.e. sanctions) below-average contributions. The tax/subsidy-rate is 
chosen to make contributions incentive compatible. In laboratory tests, this mechanism has been 
shown to sustain almost full cooperation (Falkinger et al. 2000). Our results suggest that the 
basic element of the Falkinger mechanism appeals to widely held fairness concerns. 
 
2 Experimental Design 
The experiment has two phases with 5 periods each. In phase 1, subjects play a standard 
linear public goods game in groups of 3 players. Subjects simultaneously decide how much of 20 
endowment points to keep or invest into the public good in each period. Payoffs are determined 
by , where c20 0.5i i jcπ = − + ∑ jc i is subject i’s contribution to the public good, and 0.5 is the 
marginal per-capita return of contributing to the public good. 
 The contribution stage is followed by a redistribution stage. In this stage, the 
contributions of each subject in the first stage are anonymously revealed and each subject can 
redistribute a maximum of 6 points between the other two subjects in the group. Redistribution is 
budget-neutral, i.e., the points the decision maker takes from one subject have to be transferred 
to the other subject in the group. Subject i’s payoff now is , 
where r
20 0.5i i jj ic cπ ≠= − + +∑ ∑ jj r
j denotes the points received from or taken by the other two group members. Because 
each subject can redistribute at most six points and because there are two other group members 
for every subject within a group,  is in the range of -12 to 12. ji j r≠∑
 
3 Predictions 
 We know from previous research that people systematically use costly sanctions to punish 
free riders, and that these sanctions induce higher levels of cooperation (Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
We also know that people are willing to reward cooperative behavior of others even if it is costly 
to them (Sefton et al. 2002). In one-shot games this behavior suggests that people have a 
willingness to pay for expressing social preferences, ethical values, or emotions. In our 
experiment, the decision to redistribute points between others is costless to the decision maker 
and it is therefore likely that people will make extensive use of “expressive” redistribution.  
 To illustrate the possible consequences of expressive redistribution, suppose that all 
subjects hold the belief that everyone in the group will redistribute the maximum of 6 points 
from low contributors to high contributors for any difference in contributions between other 
subjects in the group. Such a belief sustains the social optimum of full cooperation as an 
equilibrium because subjects always have an incentive to contribute marginally more than others, 
ratcheting contributions up to the maximum level. Of course, different sets of beliefs will sustain 
different equilibria. A priori, standard theory provides little guidance to predict behavior in this 
game and it is an empirical question whether redistribution has any effect on efficiency.  
 
4 Results 
 A total of 123 subjects participated in six sessions at the University of Copenhagen. 
Subjects were freshmen economics students who started studying a few weeks before the 
experiment. They earned DKK 100 (≈ US$ 16.5) on average. 
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  The experiment had three treatments. Treatment T(No) is a control without redistribution 
(5 groups), and treatment T(Redistribute) is with redistribution in phase 2 (16 groups). In 
treatment T(Vote), subjects were allowed to vote on the redistribution option before the start of 
phase 2. If the majority of the group accepted the proposal, phase 2 was implemented with the 
redistribution option. Otherwise, it was without redistribution as in T(No). 20 groups participated 
in this treatment.  
 
4.1 The effects of redistribution 
 Figure 1 shows average contributions with and without the option to redistribute, i.e. in 
treatments T(Redistribute) and T(No). We aggregate the data in phase 1 for both treatments as 
they are identical in this phase. In phase 1, the pattern of contributions replicates the typical 
findings observed in many public goods experiments: contributions start out at 50 percent of the 
endowment, followed by a decay over time. In T(No), the downward trend in average 
contributions continues after a restart effect in phase 2. In contrast, contributions sharply increase 
when the redistribution option is available. Averaged over all periods of phase 2, subjects 
contribute more than three times as much when the option to redistribute is present than when it 
is not. In T(Redistribute), the average contribution is 15.1 points, while it is only 4.5 points in 
T(No). The difference between the treatments is highly significant (p = 0.003, two-sided Mann 
Whitney test). 
 
Figure 1: Average contributions over periods 
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4.2 The motives of redistribution 
The reason why our redistribution scheme is so effective in increasing cooperation and 
efficiency is that subjects use the redistribution option, and that they use it in a systematic way. 
For example, subjects used the redistribution option in 166 out of 240 possible cases. In 71.7% 
of these cases, redistribution was in favor of the group member with the higher contribution. In 
15.1% of the cases, redistribution is directed in reverse, and in the remaining 13.3% of the cases, 
redistribution is used when there is no difference between the contributions of the other two 
players. 
 
Figure 2: Net transfer from redistribution for deviations from others’ average contributions; N = 
240  
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Figure 2 shows the net transfer from redistribution by the deviation from the average 
contribution of the other group members. The numbers on the bars indicate the number of 
observations in the respective intervals. The figure reveals that contributions below the group 
average result in a negative net transfer from redistribution (= punishment), whereas higher than 
average contributions induce a positive net transfer (= reward). According to an OLS regression1, 
the measure of association between the net transfer and the deviation from the average 
contribution from the other group members is 0.67 (p = 0.000). Subjects rarely use redistribution 
                                                 
1 The regression includes dummies for groups and periods to control for dependence between time and groups. A 
constant is also included. The coefficient of determination and the F-statistics are R2 = 0.502 and F(20, 219) = 
11.03.  
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 when others’ contributions are similar (see bar in the range -2, 2). The figure thus shows that 
subjects use redistribution systematically to punish low contributors at the benefit of high 
contributors.  
 
4.3 Voting on the option to redistribute 
The discussion above has shown that pure redistribution enhances cooperation in the 
provision of public goods and has a pronounced positive effect on efficiency. These results 
suggest that redistribution is an effective means of overcoming the free-rider problem in public 
good dilemmas. However, it is not clear that the redistribution scheme is also a socially feasible 
means to mitigate the free-rider problem for two reasons. First, subjects may underestimate the 
beneficial effects of the redistribution scheme and might oppose its introduction based on this 
belief. Second, free-riders might fear to lose from the introduction of the redistribution scheme 
and oppose it on these grounds.  
To test for the acceptance, or social feasibility, of the redistribution scheme, we 
implemented a treatment T(Vote), in which subjects voted on the redistribution option at the 
beginning of phase 2. We find that the redistribution scheme is very popular: 73.3% of subjects 
voted for the proposal, which translated into 85% (= 17 out of 20) groups accepting the 
redistribution option in phase 2. We observe no differences in contribution behavior depending 
on whether the redistribution option has been exogenously imposed or endogenously accepted 
[T(Redistribute) vs. T(Vote, accept), p = 0.264, two-sided Mann Whitney test]. The analogous 
result holds in the three groups who rejected the proposal.  
 
5 Summary and conclusion  
This paper has shown that the provision of public goods improves substantially with pure 
redistribution. Redistribution has an immediate positive effect on economic efficiency because 
money is redistributed from low contributors to high contributors. When asked to vote on the 
option to redistribute, we find that the redistribution scheme is popular.  
It is worthwhile to emphasize similarities and differences of our design compared to the 
use of redistribution aimed at improving cooperation in mechanism design. Imposed 
redistribution rules have been suggested as a device to sustain full cooperation in equilibrium 
(Falkinger 1996), and experimental research has shown that such a mechanism induces behavior 
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 in line with the theoretical predictions (Falkinger, et al. 2000). An important difference between 
the Falkinger mechanism and our scheme is that the former has a fixed exogenous sanction and 
reward structure for deviations from the average group contribution. In contrast, our scheme has 
an endogenous relation between contributions, rewards, and sanctions. It seems that subjects in 
our experiment use redistribution similarly as in the exogenously imposed redistribution rule in 
Falkinger. This observation suggests that the Falkinger mechanism proposes an intuitive and 
behaviorally relevant rule, and this behavioral feature may be an important reason why the 
exogenously imposed rule for redistribution of the Falkinger mechanism leads to efficient 
outcomes. 
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